This paper experimentally investigates the determinants of charitable giving.
Introduction
Charitable giving is of particular importance since it may finance the successful implementation of public goods. It enjoys great popularity in the US, i.e., annual data of 2014 show that total donations amounted to $258.51 billions (Giving USA, 2015) . However, less is known about individual differences in the motives of giving. Understanding who gives and why or when persons give is promising, as it can help to target fund-raising campaigns to increase charitable giving.
Focusing on the donors' side, a prominent finding is that women commonly give more than men. This is documented by evidence in the field (e.g., Piper and Schnepf, 2008; Mesch et al., 2011 ) and many economic experiments (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998; 2003) . Importantly, the determinants of these findings are mostly unclear. Croson and Gneezy (2009) argue that women are more sensitive to social cues and therefore may behave more other-regarding than men in laboratory studies. Although this reasoning may certainly apply to some experimental settings, 1 it does not explain the aforementioned empirical evidence. Hence, gathering new evidence in individual-preference differences may therefore be promising. In this respect experimental economics has established a set of prominent gender differences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) . A conspicuous finding are gender differences in risk taking. It is commonly reported that women are more risk-averse than men (e.g., Eckel Moreover, an experiment with school kids even confirms these findings in the field (Eckel et al., 2012) .
Motivated by these findings, we conducted an experiment which focuses on these two preferences at the same time. Our paper presents data which analyze whether gender differences in charitable giving are connected to gender differences in risk taking. In our simple within-subjects experiment, we first elicit subjects' risk preferences and afterwards we measure their donations to a charity (the German "Red Cross") in a dictator game. The data confirm the experimental findings on gender differences in giving (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998; 2003) , i.e., women give significantly more than men. In our experiments we show that risk preferences are indeed connected to charitable giving. Interestingly, we find that this only accounts to women. The data reveal a strong positive correlation between the risk tolerance of women and their donations to the charity. Crucially, risk tolerant women give significantly more than risk-averse ones. Focusing on women, our regressions highlight that an one-Euro increase of the investment in the risky gamble is associated with about one Euro higher donations.
3 By contrast, no correlation can be found for men. Indeed, average donation levels of men and risk-averse women do not differ. Thus, the gender difference in charitable giving we report, is exclusively driven by risk-tolerant women. Therefore our findings may have interesting implications for the interpretation of gender differences in existing dictator-game experiments.
They highlight that risk preferences may play an important role in the emergence of gender differences in dictator giving. The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present the experimental design. Afterwards we report the findings of the experiment. Subsequently, we discuss potential channels for the emergence of the results and conclude.
Experimental Design
In our within-subjects experiment participants received the instructions before each stage started. They were told that they will not be informed on the outcome of the stages until the experiment was not finished. Subjects also knew that at the end of the experiment one out of all stages would be randomly selected to be paid out. Subjects earned Taler and the exchange rate was 10 Taler = 1 Euro.
In the first stage we measured risk preferences with the investment task introduced by Gneezy and Potters (1997) . In the investment task subjects had an endowment of 100 Taler and decided on the investment in a risky lottery. There was an equal chance that the lottery would win/lose. If the lottery wins, the invested amount is multiplied by 2.5. The investment is lost if the lottery does not win. The second stage was a dictator game (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998) . Here, Participants had an endowment of 100 Taler and decided on the donation level to the German "Red Cross." They knew that the donations will be transferred by online transactions after the end of the experiment. Subjects did not know the exact usage of the fund-raising and had no information on the recipients. To ensure credibility we offered subjects that they could stay after the experiment was finished and watch us doing the online transaction. The third stage was a one-shot public good game which will be part of another study. 4 Afterwards, we elicited the Social Value Orientation (SVO) of our subjects in a non-incenticized setting. We followed the method of Van Lange et al. (1997) where subjects have to complete nine decision sets with three choices each. In this respect subjects were presented with fictional monetary splits between them and another hypothetical person. Subjects had to select one out of the three choices for each of the nine decision sets. Our experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects from various fields were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . We ran three sessions with 24 subjects each. In total 72 subjects (40 women and 32 men) participated. One session lasted approximately 45 minutes. Subjects earned on average 12.12 Euros including a show-up fee of 2 Euros.
Results
In this section we present our data. First, we separately analyze the results of subjects' dictator giving and their risk-taking behavior. Afterwards we report the main findings on the relation between risk preferences and donations to the charity. When applying non-parametric tests we always report two-sided p-values.
Dictator giving and risk preferences
We start with the analysis of subjects' dictator giving to the charity. Figure 1 shows average donations to the German Red Cross. The presentation is conditioned on male donors (left panel) and female donors (right panel).
When focusing on the diagram, it turns out that distinct gender differences exist in subjects' donations to the charity. More precisely, women donate significantly more (32.4) than men (19.8) (Mann-Whitney p = 0.033). The diagram reveals a clear pattern, i.e., the distribution of male donors is left censored. Indeed, in most of the cases (38%) men give nothing. This case occurs significantly less frequently (13%) (χ 2 (1) = 6.160, p = 0.013) for women. Therefore it can be summarized that our data confirm the findings on gender differences in dictator games (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998; 2003; Alevy et al., 2014). We turn to risk preferences and report the average choices in the investment task. The data show that women invest significantly less (31.48) in the risky lottery than men (56.19) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.003). We find that the investment level of men is higher by 44%. Thus, the data confirm the findings on gender differences in risk preferences (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Charness and Gneezy, 2012) . This establishes our first result.
Result 1:
(a) Women donate significantly more than men. (b) Women are significantly more risk averse than men.
We turn to our main question and study whether the risk preferences of women and men may predict donation levels. A conspicuous finding is the strong positive correlation between the risk preferences of women and donations. A Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is positive and highly significant (ρ = 0.485, p = 0.002), supporting the notion that more risktolerant women give more. 5 In contrast, no such correlation can be found for men (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient: ρ = −0.137, p = 0.454).
Main results
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Next, we compare average donations of risk-averse and risk-tolerant women to men's donations. Therefore, we split up the female distribution and categorize women in risk-averse and risk-tolerant subjects. Focusing on the distribution it turns out that 42.5% of the women invest less or equal 28, whereas 57.5% invest less or equal 30. Hence, we selected the mean of these investments (29) as threshold. We classify women who invest less or equal 29 as risk averse, whereas women who invest more than 29 are categorized as risk tolerant. The average donations of risk-averse women (19.00) are not significantly different from men's average donations (19.75) (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.773). By contrast, risk-tolerant women give significantly more (42.22) than all men (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.003). This suggests for our data that the gender difference in donations is driven by risk-tolerant women.
Our results are in line with recent findings of Angerer et al. (2015) . Motivated by theories of reciprocity the authors focus on more than 1,000 primary school kids to analyze how risk and intertemporal choices influence altruism. The paper reports a non-linear relation between risk preferences and donations. In the current paper we find similar results in an adult subject pool. By contrast, we aim to find explanations for the occurrence of common gender differences in donation behavior. Our findings suggest that this non-linear relation occurs as a result of the gender differences in our sample. Figure 2 would also show an inverse u-shaped pattern, 7 if we lay the low donations of very risk-tolerant subjects (see risk-tolerant men in the left panel) over the high donations of moderate risk-tolerant subjects (see risk-tolerant women in the right panel). To get a in-depth understanding, we run Tobit-regression analyses. In model (1) we add female, a dummy which is positive for female donors. Risk is the invested amount in the risky lottery. In model (1) only female is highly significant with a positive sign. Hence, women donate more to the charity which confirms our previous findings. In model (2) we add the interaction term female × risk. Strikingly, we find that its coefficient is highly significant and positive. It follows for women, that an one-Euro increase of the investment in the risky lottery is associated with about one Euro more donated to the charity. This confirms the pattern we observe in Figure 2 . Noteworthy, Female becomes insignificant which indicates that the gender difference in donations can be entirely explained by less risk-averse women who give more. In model (3) we add control variables. Prosocial is a dummy which is positive when subjects in the SVO task were classified as prosocial. 8 We also incorporate subjects' age and control whether participants are econ students. In model (3) we find that female × risk is highly significant with a moderately smaller coefficient. We thus conclude that the main result is robust when adding controls. Prosocial is the only control which is significant with a positive coefficient. Hence, prosocial subjects give more. Since the proportion of prosocial women (67%) and men (68%) is almost identical, the gender difference in donations cannot be explained by differences in prosociality.
Regression analyses
Result 2:
(a) Women show an economically significant and positive correlation between risk tolerance and donations.
(b) The gender difference in donations is entirely driven by risk-tolerant women.
Discussion
In this section we discuss potential drivers for the findings we report in the previous section. Our data revealed that gender differences in charitable giving may be explained by women's level of risk tolerance. More precisely, we found for women that a positive correlation between risk tolerance and charitable giving exists. The question remains why an increased level of risk tolerance may enhance charitable giving for female donors.
A reason might be the uncertain nature of efficacy aspects of charities. According to Bekkers and Wiepking's (2011) framework on charitable giving perceived efficacy is influenced by multiple things. One aspect are efficiency concerns of charities such as fund-raising expenditures and overhead costs (Gneezy et al., 2014) . Hence, donors who are more confident on charities' efficient organization may give more. Another aspect is the utilization of the donated money. In this regard it is often uncertain for what purpose the donations will be used, or to which extent donations reach the recipients. In this regard, Small and Loewenstein (2003) report that donors in a field experiment give more when recipients are determined before the fund-raising takes place. In this regard, donors receive information about the recipients, i.e., how needy the anonymous persons are before they donate. Similar findings about information effects on recipients are found by Charness and Gneezy (2008) . The authors find that dictators give more when they know the last name of the recipient.
The lack of information on possible recipients and the unknown utilization of the money may also apply to our setting. The reason is that in our experiments we only mentioned that the dictated money will be donated to the German "Red Cross." However, there was ambiguity on the target of the collected donations as we did not inform subjects on the usage of the collected amount. It follows that more risk tolerant subjects may be more confident to donate to charities when targets of the donations are unknown. This may explain the positive correlation between risk preferences and charitable giving. But why do we only find these effects for women? This might be due to general differences in social preferences such as altruism or warm glow. For instance, it is likely that a high fraction of men is generally not interested in donating to the charity. This would be in line with Figure 1 where we observed that 38% of men give nothing. At the same time this fraction of men on average invests a high level of 67.92 in the risky gamble. By contrast, for the case of female donors it may be that risk-averse women would like to donate but at the same time they care about the "context", i.e., the uncertain situation in terms of the charitiy's efficacy. As a consequence, risk-averse women may give less, whereas risk tolerant women could be prepared to donate. The finding that women behave context dependent is in line with the evidence reported by Croson and Gneezy (2009) . We are aware that the aforementioned interpretations are speculative in nature as further channels may apply to explain the observed correlation.
Conclusion
In the current paper we analyzed the determinants of gender differences in charitable giving. Motivated by repeated findings of gender differences in risk taking (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2002; , we focused on risk preferences as potential explanation. First, we confirm existing gender differences in charitable giving (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1998) and risk taking (e.g., Charness and Gneezy, 2012) . That is, women give substantially more than male subjects. Second, we show that risk preferences may predict when women give more. Our results find clear evidence for an economically significant positive correlation between women's risk tolerance and charitable giving. The data show that the gender difference in donations we find, can be entirely explained by risk-tolerant women. Interestingly, risk-tolerant women give significantly more than men, whereas risk-averse ones do not differ from men. A conspicuous finding is that 38% of the men donate nothing. The results may shed new light on established gender differences in charitable giving (e.g., Piper and Schnepf, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) as they suggest that attitudes toward uncertainty may play an important role for charitable giving. Our result implies interesting policy implications. For instance, it raises the question: how to design fund-raising environments which are characterized with fewer risks? Moreover, the finding may be a promising starting point for future research. In this regard, it is interesting to find out whether the risk-averse fraction of women would indeed increase their donations if the environment would be less uncertain.
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